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How do you audit an AI agent’s actions?

Audit AI agent actions with action-level logging that records what the agent was asked, what it decided, which tools and systems it touched, which credential it used, what it proposed, who approved it, and what changed. This produces one traceable record per business action rather than fragments scattered across systems. Mapping those logs to the NIST AI RMF or a MITRE ATLAS technique supports both incident response and compliance. Logging that captures decisions and credential use, not just model outputs, is what makes an agent's behavior defensible after an incident.

By |2026-08-11T06:14:52-05:00August 11, 2026||

Is MCP safe to use in the enterprise?

Model Context Protocol is usable in the enterprise, but tool discovery must be treated as untrusted ingress. A tool's description, and any later change to it, can carry instructions the model will follow, so tools cannot be trusted on name alone. Public U.S. National Security Agency guidance on MCP recommends inspecting every tool schema before it reaches the model. In practice, run that inspection and exposure management inside a security control plane, pin and review tool definitions, and give agents least-privilege access to only the tools a task requires.

By |2026-08-11T06:09:07-05:00August 11, 2026||

Do we need a security control plane, or can our iPaaS handle it?

An iPaaS such as Boomi or MuleSoft moves data reliably but does not enforce agent-level identity, per-action authorization, token brokering, and action logging on its own. A security control plane sits above the iPaaS, loosely coupled and platform-agnostic, and intercepts agent actions before they reach enterprise systems. For read-only, single-system agents, native platform controls and model guardrails may be enough. For agents that act across systems or carry financial and regulatory consequence, the control plane adds the zero-trust authentication, scoped credentials, policy gates, and kill switch that an integration platform was not built to provide.

By |2026-08-11T06:16:24-05:00August 11, 2026|, |

How do you stop prompt injection from reaching enterprise systems?

You cannot fully prevent prompt injection, so the practical defense is to limit what a successfully injected agent can do. Detection alone is unreliable, especially for indirect injection, where the NIST generative AI profile notes malicious instructions can ride inside otherwise trusted data. Combine input and content filtering with execution-layer controls: least-privilege roles, scoped per-action tokens, deny-by-default policy gates, and human approval on consequential writes, so an injected instruction has no standing credential and no unattended path to a system of record. Because model-side filters can be bypassed, the enforceable boundary belongs at the point of action.

By |2026-08-11T06:07:06-05:00August 11, 2026|, |

What is the difference between AI security and AI agent security?

AI security protects models and their outputs, while AI agent security protects the actions an agent takes across enterprise systems. Traditional AI security covers model robustness, data poisoning, bias, and content safety. Agent security adds identity, least-privilege authorization, credential and token handling, real-time policy enforcement, human approval, and action-level audit, because an agent can read, write, and transact rather than only generate text. The distinction matters as agents spread: Gartner projects 40% of enterprise applications will embed task-specific AI agents by the end of 2026, up from less than 5% in 2025.

By |2026-08-11T06:06:10-05:00August 11, 2026||
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